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TAP, the Portuguese national airline was founded in 1945, and since then it has been the 
predominant airline operating in the Portuguese market. It offers short, medium and long-haul 
routes mainly focusing on the European, South American and African territories.  However, in 
recent years it has been losing market share in the short-haul segment to low-cost carriers, who 
continue to penetrate and grow in the Portuguese market. 
Due to the liberalization of the European airline market in 1997, TAP, and the other established 
airlines at that time, saw major changes in the industry. Within a few years, several low-cost 
carriers (LCCs) were able to enter the market and reach leadership positions. Given the current 
threat that low-cost carriers pose to TAP, the company has to make a strategic decision on how 
to adapt to this kind of competition and how to best react to LCCs. Should it focus its strategy 
on differentiating, thus offering a value proposition that is worth paying a premium for? Or 
should the company restructure the business and compete with the low-cost airlines on price 
terms? 
This case study analyses the competition between LCCs and full-service carriers (FSCs) in Europe, 
by explaining the differences between the two business models, and the strategies full-service 
carriers have followed. The objective of the case is to allow the reader to make an informed 
decision regarding the general strategy TAP should choose when competing against LCCs.  
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Título: TAP – Competição com companhias aéreas de baixo custo 
Autor: Miguel Gaspar 
A TAP, companhia aérea nacional Portuguesa, foi fundada em 1945 e, desde então, tem sido a 
companhia predominante a operar no mercado Português. Oferece voos de pequeno, médio e 
longo-curso, focando-se no mercado Europeu, Sul-Americano e Africano. Contudo, tem vindo a 
perder quota de mercado, no segmento de pequeno-curso, para companhias aéreas de baixo 
custo.   
A TAP, juntamente com todas as outras companhias Europeias existentes na altura, 
atravessaram um período de enorme mudança com a liberalização do mercado aeronáutico 
Europeu em 1997. Após a liberalização, um elevado número de transportadoras de baixo custo 
entrou no mercado e atingiu posições de liderança poucos anos depois. Tendo em conta a 
ameaça que as mesmas representam para a TAP, é necessário tomar uma decisão estratégica 
relativamente à concorrência com este tipo de transportadoras. Deverá a TAP focar-se numa 
estratégia de diferenciação, oferecendo uma proposta de valor elevada? Ou deverá concorrer 
com estas companhias em preços? 
Este caso analisa a concorrência entre as companhias tradicionais e de baixo custo no mercado 
Europeu. Aborda também as diferenças entre os dois modelos de negócio e as estratégias que 
as companhias tradicionais têm adotado. O objetivo primordial do caso é permitir ao leitor 
efetuar uma decisão informada sobre qual a estratégia que a TAP deverá seguir, para concorrer 
com as transportadoras aéreas de baixo custo. 
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It was a typical Thursday morning when Fernando Pinto, the Chief Executive Officer of TAP, was 
eating breakfast, getting ready to go to work and heard on the news that easyJet after opening 
a route to Ponta Delgada, intended to continue the investment in the Portuguese market by 
opening a base in Porto[24]. Ryanair has gone even further since its CEO, Michael O’Leary, has 
stated “we think we will surpass TAP and be the biggest airline company in Portugal”[31] (the 
company recently launched its base in Lisbon). After hearing this he started wondering what the 
future of TAP would be with the biggest low-cost carriers (LCCs) betting heavily in the 
Portuguese market. Therefore, he asked his advisors to provide an analysis of the competition 
between full-service carriers  (FSCs) and LCCs in Europe and assess possible strategic solutions 
TAP can incorporate.  
Company overview - TAP 
TAP Portugal is the main Portuguese airline, flying to 87 destinations in 38 countries with a fleet 
of 77 airplanes and operating on average 296 flights per day. In 2014 it achieved around 2,7 
billion euros (exhibit 1) in revenue and had 13 268 employees[33].   
History  
Transportes Aéreos Portugueses was founded on the 14th of March 1945, by then director of the 
civil aviation secretariat, Humberto Delgado. In that time it acquired the first two DC-3 Dakota 
airplanes, with a 21 passenger capacity. The first commercial route, Lisbon – Madrid, was 
opened on the 19th of September 1946. Later that year the “imperial route” is created which 
connected Lisbon – Luanda - Lourenço Marques (Maputo) and had a duration of 15 days. 
The company continued to open new routes and in 1953 changed from a public service company 
to a public limited company (plc). However, with the Portuguese revolution in April, 1974 the 
company follows the trend of extensive nationalizations and is again transformed into a public 
service company in 1975. In 1979 the company changes its name to TAP Air Portugal and in 1980 
goes through a rebranding process. It continues to open new routes and has some profitability 
problems until the start of the new millennium when for the first time in several years the 
company has a profit. It undergoes another rebranding, changing its name to TAP Portugal with 
the intent of reflecting modernization and the start of a new era.  
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In 2006 TAP assumes the control of Varig Manutenção & Engenharia (VEM), the largest 
maintenance center in South America, and in the subsequent years TAP is distinguished with 
several awards including, World Travel Awards’ (WTA) Leading Airline to Africa in 2011 and 2012, 
Leading Airline to South America in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012. It was recognized by Global 
Traveler magazine as the best airline in Europe in 2011, 2012 and 2013 and in 2014 it receives, 
once again, recognition by the WTA as Europe’s leading airline to Africa and Europe’s leading 
airline to South America[34]. 
Industry  
The aviation industry has suffered significant changes in the past years. In the last 40 years over 
1300[24] (exhibit 2) airlines were formed and a major cause for this exponential increase was the 
liberalization of the markets. Twenty years after the North American deregulation, established 
in 1978, Europe followed the same road and in 1997, the market was liberalized allowing any 
European airline to provide services inside any EU country[35]. This of course, favoured the 
exponential growth of the low-cost carriers in the 1990s and in the beginning of the third 
millennium.  
For this analysis, it is important to realize the main trends in the global aviation industry, 
however, the main focus will be on the European and Portuguese markets since these are the 
markets where TAP is threatened the most by the competition of LCCs. 
Worldwide 
With the increase in efficiency, scale economies and economic development, travelling by plane 
is no longer seen as luxurious but as a common transportation method and the most practical 
to cover long distances. This is represented by the exponential growth in airline passengers 
registered over the years.  According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the 
total number of passengers will continue to increase significantly in the coming years[16]. 
Europe 
Having established that the general market is set for a continued growth it is important to 
further analyse the European Market. Despite being the market which will have the smallest 
growth rate according to IATA, it is still forecasted to grow by 2,7% per year until 2034[16].  
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Another important fact is that most of the flights involving EU28 countries, measured by the 
departures or arrivals involving at least one of these countries, are routes within the European 
Union. Which means, the highest percentage of flights originate and land in EU28 countries[12]. 
This fact, helps us realize why Europe is seen as such a valuable market for low-cost carriers. 
Typically these airlines operate short and medium-haul flights and Europe is ideal to operate 






This translates into the increasing influence, in the past few years of low-cost carriers in Europe, 
which can be verified by the presence of several low-cost companies in the list of the biggest 
airlines in Europe measured by the number of passengers carried.   
 
Passengers Carried (in 
Millions) 
Type Centre of operations 
Lufthansa Group 105,9 FSC Frankfurt and Munich 
Ryanair 81,7 LCC Dublin and London 






easyJet 64,8 LCC London 
Turkish Airlines 54,7 FSC Istanbul 
Aeroflot Group 34,7 FSC Moscow 
Air Berlin Group 31,7 FSC Berlin and Dusseldorf 
SAS Group 28,4 FSC 
Copenhagen, 
Stockholm and Oslo 
Norwegian Air Shuttle 24 LCC Oslo 
Alitalia 23,9 FSC Rome 
Pegasus Airlines 17,3 LCC Istanbul 
Wizz Air 15,8 LCC Budapest 
Transaero 13,2 FSC Saint Petersburg 
TAP Portugal 11,4 FSC Lisbon 
Figure 1: Air passenger transport in the EU28 
Source: Eurostat news release, December 4th 2014, Air passenger transport in the EU28 
 
 
Table 1: Biggest airlines in Europe. 




The European market is also being affected by the growth of airlines such as, Emirates, Turkish 
Airlines, Etihad and Qatar. Taking advantage of their privileged locations1 these companies are 
growing fast and intend to provide a global network, establishing themselves as the main 
carriers to connect European passengers to long-haul destinations. This means, in addition to 
the competition with LCCs in the short-haul routes, European FSCs will have to face severe 
competition in the long-haul segment as well from the emerging airlines that are penetrating 
the European market[36]. 
Competitive environment 
As it was stated, in the current environment TAP faces competition not only from low-cost 
carriers but also from full-service carriers. However, the analysis will be focused on the LCC 
competition.  
The main LCC players in the Portuguese market have been gaining market share2 in the two most 
important airports in Portugal, Lisbon and Porto. This increase in the number of passengers 
carried is negatively correlated with the percentage of passengers carried by TAP[17] which leads 
us to assume that TAP is negatively affected from the penetration of LCCs. 
Ryanair  
Ryanair was created in 1985 by Tony Ryan, Christopher Ryan and Liam Lonergan and began by 
operating a small route between Waterford and London. In 1990 the company was having major 
losses which led to a restructuring procedure that applied Southwest’s airlines low-fares model 
and made Ryanair the first low-cost airline in Europe[29]. Currently, Ryanair is the biggest low-
                                                          
1  “The Gulf is handily placed between Europe, Asia, Africa and America: all are in range of modern long-
haul jets. Istanbul, on the edge of Europe, is a short-haul flight from 55 capital cities”[36] 
2 Measured by the percentage of passengers carried 
Figure 2: Comparison of TAP’s and LCCs market share in Lisbon’s and Porto’s airports. 
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cost airline in Europe and second biggest airline in terms of passengers carried, after the 
Lufthansa group. 
In terms of its competition with TAP, Ryanair is the biggest low-cost competitor. In 2014, it had 
three bases in Portugal, Lisbon, Faro and Porto, being the leader in the last two and acquiring 
almost a 10% market share in Lisbon, after only 9 months of the base’s launch in 2014. Nowadays 
Ryanair offers 17 routes out of the Lisbon airport, 29 routes out of Faro and 42 routes from Porto 
airport[29]. Furthermore, Ryanair has stated that it has the intention of keeping the growth in the 
Portuguese market[31].   
easyJet  
EasyJet was founded in 1995 by Sir Stelios Haji-loannou and started by operating two routes 
from London to Glasgow and Edinburgh[10]. Currently it is the 5th biggest airline in Europe 
according to the number of passengers carried. 
In Portugal, EasyJet poses a relevant threat to TAP as the second biggest LCC in the country. It 
operates in the five biggest airports and has two bases, Lisbon, since 2012 and Porto, since 
March 2015. It currently offer, 16 destinations out of Lisbon, 11 out of Porto and 10 out of 
Faro[10] and intends to keep growing in the Portuguese market[24].  
Vueling and Transavia 
The other LCCs worth mentioning in the Portuguese market are Vueling and Transavia. Both are 
subsidiaries of full-service carriers’ conglomerates. Vueling is owned by IAG group while 
Transavia is a subsidiary for the Air France – KLM group. These represent a small percentage of 
passengers carried however, they still figure among the top 10 airlines flying out of the two 
major Portuguese airports[17].  
According to the Portuguese Civil Aviation Institute (INAC), Vueling is a constant presence in the 
top 10 airlines operating in Lisbon, with a market share in terms of passengers carried of 
approximately 2% [17]. 
Transavia is also a relevant player, being one of the top 10 companies operating in Porto with 
approximately 4%[17] of the total number of passengers carried, and currently offers 4 routes out 
of Lisbon and 5 routes out of Porto[41]. The Air-France KLM’s subsidiary was also mentioned in 
the Portuguese press regarding the possibility of opening two bases in Portugal, Lisbon and 
Porto until 2020[40].  
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Differences between low-cost carriers and full-service carriers 
Business model 
Low-cost airlines and full-service carriers display many differences which result in two distinct 
business models(exhibit 3).  
The LCCs business model achieves results through low fares. They operate point-to-point3 short-
haul flights and have more operational bases spread between several countries. The low-cost 
business model is profitable despite the low fares since it also depends on the combination of 
many other factors. LCCs are cost efficient, which is derived from many aspects, some of them 
are the various economies of scale, the optimal use of staff, using the internet as the exclusive 
channel for ticket sales and the regular use of secondary lower cost airports.  Another important 
aspect of the LCC business model are the ancillary revenues4 (exhibit 4). In LCCs everything 
besides the ticket has a cost, which represents a substantial source of revenue for LCCs. Almost 
everything one would expect from a FSC, such as, choosing seats, having a meal, or being able 
to carry hold luggage5 has a price on most low-cost carriers.  
FSCs operate all types of flights, short, medium and long-haul and have much fewer bases, 
usually located in important cities of their countries of origin. Typically, they use a hub and spoke 
system which means they gather passengers form secondary airports at a major hub and then 
transport them to another major hub, thus having connecting flights[14]. FSCs can also be flag 
carriers6 (TAP’s case), which means they can have social obligations (and benefits) thus having 
restrictions in the destinations they offer[15]. LCCs have no social obligations towards any specific 
state. Another important aspect is that after the deregulation, governments lost part of the 
political power necessary to provide benefits to their respective flag carriers[15].  
Full-service carriers also have more amenities and a more personalized service. The FSC business 
model depends largely on the long-haul flights and some of its medium and short-haul routes 
are just connections serving the more profitable long-haul segment[2]. In spite of the recent 
efforts to increase its cost efficiency, FSCs are still not as efficient as LCC.  
                                                          
3 Point-to-point means passengers are flown directly to their destination without going through any 
central hub. 
4 Revenues from non-ticket sources, such as the sale of food and beverages, baggage, among others…  
5 Luggage placed in the hold of the plane 
6 Airlines owned by a government or that are locally registered in a given state and enjoy preferential 




In aviation, having a fleet that follows a certain pattern, (model, manufacturer, generation, 
among others…) is called fleet commonality and while most airline companies do this in some 
way, LCCs follow this principle to the extreme by operating a fleet composed by only one or two 
models.  Consequently, LCCs achieve lower costs in training everybody involved in dealing with 
the aircraft (pilots, crew, etc…), and also benefit from scale economies in the maintenance 
operations since every plane needs the same components. This not only ensures greater 
flexibility in moving parts between aircrafts but it also enables LCCs to possibly achieve better 
deals with manufacturers in ordering parts and planes[4].  
For instance, Ryanair operates more than 300 airplanes of the same model, Boeing 737-800, 
with an average fleet age of 5,5 years[28] meaning that planes are equipped with the latest 
technology and the company can benefit from the advantages explained above. EasyJet 
operates only two types of planes (Airbus 319 and Airbus 320)[9] while the FSCs counterparts 
operate a larger number of models. For instance, TAP’s fleet is composed by 8 types[33] of planes 
(including the ones operated by Portugalia Airlines7) which implies higher costs (exhibit 5). 
Routes and bases 
Passengers often think about why they have to take a bus or train that takes one hour to reach 
the city. Wouldn’t it be easier if easyJet, Ryanair and all the other LCCs travelled to the main 
airports? It would but this does not happen by chance.  
It is a fact that the vast majority of LCCs travel to secondary airports. This happens because in a 
large number of secondary airports state aid is given to the low-cost carriers in order to develop 
the region. This aid usually comes from the airports (majority of airports are state owned) and 
it may come under the form of a fee for every passenger that the LCCs bring, it can be as a 
subsidy to start flying to that airport, and in most cases it can be in the form of discounts in 
landing and baggage handling charges[38]. This type of aid is regulated by the EU aviation 
guidelines and it plays a significant role in the low-cost business model. However, this type of 
“revenue” translates into controversy, since it is hard to prove that the subsidies provided to 
LCCs are indeed used to develop that region and not to finance its operations elsewhere. Also, 
in light of fairer competition, full-service carriers complain about these easier conditions 
provided to low-cost carriers and there are cases in which legal action is pursued. Air France, for 
                                                          
7 Portugalia Airlines or PGA is a Portuguese subsidiary of TAP 
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example, took matters into their own hands as they sued 20 airports in its home market for 
giving these type of subsidies[38].  
Nonetheless, the time for special benefits for LCCs in Europe is coming to an end since the EU 
heard the concerns of the FSCs and in 2014 adopted new aviation guidelines. This new set of 
rules is an update to the last aviation guidelines issued in 2005 and intends to provide better 
means for fair competition in the airline industry[11].  
Regarding the absolute differences in the number of routes and bases, LCCs have a significantly 
higher number of both. Most LCCs are a short-haul point to point airline which means they 
operate short-haul flights and perform limited connection flights. Furthermore, LCCs are not 
flagship airlines8 (as is the case of many FSCs) which means they can have operational bases in 
multiple countries and serve several destinations departing from each of these bases.  Figure 3, 
shows the differences in bases and routes between TAP’s most direct LCCs competitors and the 







In the case of TAP’s most direct low-cost competitors, easyJet and Ryanair, they have much 
higher number of bases9 compared with TAP and other European FSCs. As stated before, it is 
also observable that LCCs only have short-haul and medium-haul flights while FSCs operate long-
haul as well. Of the 87 destinations TAP currently flies to, 31 are long-haul flights. 
Despite the absolute difference in the number of routes offered, FSCs counterbalance this fact 
due to the existence of alliances between airlines. These alliances allow codeshare agreements, 
                                                          
8 Flag carriers 








































Figure 3: Comparison of bases and routes 




which are contracts between airlines that enable them to share flights. This means, airlines can 
sell flights in their own reservation systems operated by other airlines in the alliance[1]. Hence, 
airlines have access to the destinations offered by partner companies and can get additional 
revenue from routes they do not operate[33]. TAP is part of the Star alliance, which is considered 
the biggest airline alliance[32], and this allows TAP to increase the number of destinations it “flies” 
to (exhibit 6). 
Costs 
Regarding costs, it is a well-known fact that LCCs are much more cost efficient than full-service 
carriers, being this one of the main competitive advantages, low-cost carriers have.  Two of the 
major aspects of airlines’ costs are fuel and staff. When we look at the operational expenses of 
LCCs we see that fuel has a higher percentage in the total of operating costs. However, this 
higher share is deceiving given that the price of fuel is one of the few operational costs airlines 
don’t control. Some airlines even exclude fuel from the operational expenses possibly because 
the price of fuel is something that can’t be easily influenced.  
Before comparing the costs of full-service carriers and low-cost carriers it is important to explain 
one of the most relevant measures available to compare airlines costs - The cost per available 
seat mile (CASM). The CASM is achieved by calculating the available seat miles (ASM), which is 
the total number of miles that the seats available for sale10 flew. After dividing the operating 
expenses by the ASM, the CASM is obtained[3]. When comparing the CASM of the two biggest 
LCCs in Europe with TAP and the two biggest FSCs11 we can observe that the low-cost companies 
have much lower CASM. This, once again is due to a higher cost efficiency. This cost efficiency is 






                                                          
10 The seats for sale, are all the seats in an aircraft with the purpose of carrying passengers, which means 
the seats of crew and pilots are excluded.  Therefore, ASM are calculated by multiplying the number of 
available seats by the number of miles flown.  
11 Lufthansa Passenger Airlines includes SWISS and Austrian Airlines 
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TAP does not perform badly on the CASM measure since it achieves a cost lower than both of 
the other FSCs identified in 2014. Nonetheless, after analysing the operating margin of 2014, it 
is clear that TAP still needs to improve its operational efficiency, and this can be done by 
changing the factors that influence it (exhibit 7).  
Another takeaway from the analysis above is that staff costs represent a much lower share in 
LCCs operational expenses than in FSCs. Staff is an aspect directly controlled by the companies, 
thus indicating this is a differentiating aspect for low-cost airlines. This is mainly due to the 
different company policies. Usually, FSCs have to deal with powerful work unions12 that don’t 
allow mass restructuring and salary cuts while LCCs are formed with a cost saving policy which 
enables them to be “stricter” with their work force[15] and pay less than typical market values[6]. 
Also, LCCs ensure their workers know that there is a need for flexibility and to perform different 
tasks. This means that pilots, for instance, can also help in cleaning the plane to achieve a quicker 
turnaround time13. To better understand these higher staff costs we can look at the number of 
employees per available seat mile and the difference between LCCs and FSCs is clear. 
                                                          
12 While this case study was being written, there was a strike called by the pilot’s work union of TAP, 
which lasted 10 days and cost the company approximately 35 million Euros[13].  
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Figure 4: Comparison of cost per available seat mile and operating margin in 2014 





Strategies followed by FSCs to fight the low-cost competition 
Ever since low-cost carriers appeared FSCs have been trying to develop strategies that would 
allow them to accommodate this change in the aviation industry and reach profits despite the 
higher costs. Several strategic decisions have been made by most of FSCs, however, in Europe, 
LCCs are dominating the intra-European market[7], reaching higher profit margins and continuing 
to grow. Nonetheless, some strategies are more effective than others, and some are even a 
necessity for survival in this fierce competitive market. In the following section some of the more 
frequent strategies followed by FSCs will be identified.  
Reducing costs 
One of these necessities is to reduce costs. This is the most common measure and one that the 
vast majority of the full-service carriers followed[2]. To adapt to a competitive environment in 
which low-cost carriers are thriving in Europe, FSCs knew that in order to stay competitive they 
would also need to become more efficient. Many FSCs have even accommodated practices 
developed by LCCs[42]. Improving this aspect can be done in several ways some of which we 
already mentioned earlier.  
It is possible to cut costs by modernizing and standardizing the fleet. Modernizing can decrease 
fuel consumption and a uniform fleet enables economies of scale derived from commonality14. 
Another option regarding aircrafts, is to “adapt travel class configurations to specific 
markets”[21]. For instance, Lufthansa modified its fleet of Airbus A340 for a two-class 
                                                          
14 In aviation Commonality is the principle called to a fleet that follows a certain pattern (model, 


























Figure 5: Comparison of employees per available seat mile 




configuration for routes where premium demand is lower, hence lowering unit costs. Air France 
is also restructuring its medium and short-haul fleets by decreasing the number of aircrafts 
intended for this type of routes[2]. 
Another way to reducing unit costs is to increase productivity which in turn can be achieved in 
many ways. For instance, decreasing the turnaround time. Many FSCs have been trying to 
understand how Ryanair is able to disembark all the passengers of an aircraft, clean the 
passenger area, refill foods and beverages, fuel and board the new passengers in just 25 
minutes[39].  A quicker turnaround would allow an increase in productivity measured in flight 
hours per aircraft.  Air France, for example, intends to increase its productivity in the medium-
haul flights by 9% until the end of 2015[2]. 
Some of the full-service carriers had to undergo more drastic measures and needed to go 
through restructuring processes in order to lower their costs. International Airlines Group, had 
to cut 3000[42] jobs at its Spanish subsidiary, Iberia.  
So far, FSCs were able to reduce the cost gap to their low-cost rivals by more than one third. In 
2013 a full-service carrier spent, on average, 3,12 cents more than LCCs to move a seat through 
the air  for one mile. This is a significant improvement compared to the 4,52 cent premium on 
2006[19]. There are risks, however, of focusing too much efforts on trimming costs.  As FSCs 
emulate LCCs they force themselves into competing solely on price and this is done sometimes 
by cutting into FSCs already thin margins[37].  
Mergers and acquisitions 
As airlines cut costs, they were forced to face the LCCs on unfavorable terms, therefore, some 
airlines have already failed such as, Alitalia, MALEV, Mexican and Air Jamaica while the 
“survivors tend to seek efficiency through consolidation”[37]. 
The past two decades have seen the creation of massive airline groups such as, International 
Airlines Group, with the merger of Iberia and British Airways in 2011, Air France – KLM, which 
resulted from the merger of Air France and KLM in 2004, the Lufthansa group, since Lufthansa 
acquired both SWISS and Austrian Airlines in 2005 and 2008 (respectively), United Airlines 
merged with Continental Airlines in 2012, Northwest Airlines merged in Delta Airlines in 2010, 
US Airways merged with American Airlines in 2013, and more examples can be named.   
This type of deals has been very common in the past few years in the effort by FSCs to increase 
efficiency through mergers and acquisitions.  
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TAP itself is currently waiting to be privatized and if everything goes according to plan it will be 
acquired. The state will receive the final offers for the company on the 5th of June 2015[23].  
Entering the low-cost market 
In spite of the consolidation processes some full-service carriers had with other airlines on the 
same segment, there is also a clear pattern that has been arising from FSCs - to acquire or create 
their own low-cost carrier.  
In Europe this was a path followed by the top 3 FSCs airline groups. . The Air France – KLM group 
was the first of the major FSCs in Europe to own a low-cost company due to Transavia, which 
was already owned by KLM when the companies merged. Lufthansa acquired Germanwings 
from its already subsidiary Eurowings in 200815. In 2013, the IAG group also reinforced its 
presence on the low-cost market when it took over Vueling Airlines, which was already partly 
owned by Iberia. 
Strategies designed for these LCCs by the parent company may vary but it makes sense for FSCs 
to pass on their less-profitable short-haul segments to their low-cost subsidiaries, allowing these 
companies to take over some control of the domestic market and achieve higher margins on the 
latter,  while focusing themselves on the more profitable long-haul routes. There are, although, 
some risks for a FSC to acquire or launch its own LCC mostly due to the possibility of 
cannibalization16, therefore such a strategic move needs careful deliberation.   
Ancillary revenue 
Ancillary revenue, has been part of the LCC business model since the beginning. However, the 
trend in the current business environment is for full-service carriers to start charging for 
additional services[37].  
It is only natural that FSCs try to incorporate some of the LCCs success factors, however in this 
case, this measure bears a risk since it makes the difference in value proposition offered by LCCs 
and FSCs thinner, while LCCs continue to dominate on tariff prices. An example of this is British 
Airways that started charging more for additional checked baggage[37], or Delta Air Lines charging 
passengers to see a movie on board, or as many FSCs do by charging passengers for Wi-Fi access. 
                                                          
15 Germanwings operations will be incorporated into the Eurowings brand once again in October 2015, 
allowing the Lufthansa group to comply with its objective to unify its low-cost segment and create a 
short and long-haul option for customers with the Eurowings brand. 
16 The negative impact that a company’s new product has on the sales performance of its already 
existing products.  
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There is a big set of examples that can be found but this type of revenue is starting to be a 
necessity for airlines all around the world. According to CNN Money, in some cases ancillary fees 
make up for 20%[25] of the company’s total revenue.  
Differentiation 
It is also possible to tackle the competition by offering differentiation services and focusing on 
a more high-quality service. LCCs are dominating the short-haul market but FSCs still have a 
significant share in the business segment and dominate the long-haul routes. However, this may 
change in the near future since LCCs, such as easyJet and Ryanair have begun to tackle the 
business traveler market[37] and intend to enter the long-haul segment[8]. EasyJet, for instance, 
is doing this by shifting its focus to primary airports and by starting to offer additional services 
such as complimentary seat reservations and flexible ticketing17[37].  
Nevertheless, on the other end of the spectrum, some FSCs started improving even more its 
services in order to become high-quality carriers and attract more customers that are less 
sensitive to price. Part of the growth in the airline industry comes from business customers at 
the lower end of the hierarchy[15], therefore it is possible for FSCs to try to capture this segment 
by offering services than create higher switching costs such as loyalty programs. For business 
customers, frequency18 is also a main differentiator between similar airlines on a certain 
route[15], implying that airlines can also explore this aspect. But even for business customers it is 
important to be aware of the competition and have competitive prices. Travel agents are usually 
in charge of corporate demand and these agents have to comply with company’s strict travel 
policies and budgets[15].  
 Lufthansa is one of the full-service airlines that wants to excel at offering a high quality service 
and aims at achieving quality leadership in all classes. Being an airline in which 42,2%[21] of the 
long-haul revenue is already derived from business and first class customers, a strategy focused 
on quality where existing services are personalized and additional benefits are established, may 
be the right approach to follow.  
                                                          
17 Ticket that allow some date flexibility 




What has TAP done so far? 
TAP, as all the other full-service carriers had to adapt to a changing industry and perform some 
structural changes. TAP has been trying to decrease unit costs while growing and has done so 
by renewing capacity.  In 2014 it introduced 11 new routes and 6 new airplanes, 4 of which, 
intended for the medium-haul segment. From the 11 routes it introduced, 7 are in Europe, 2 in 
Brazil and 2 in Latin America. In spite of the efforts TAP was only able to reduce its CASM by 
0,3% in 2014 compared to the previous year[33]. TAP has managed to grow in revenue, 
passengers carried and in load factor19, however it is still behind some of its industry 
peers(exhibit 8).  
It has also been trying to increase the Revenue per unit and has done so by introducing a new 
system that optimizes the utilization of the network20 and ensures a real time tuning of demand 
and supply, ensuring a better match in prices which will in turn provide a higher revenue per 
ASM. Furthermore, it has been expanding its offer of destinations on the most profitable long-
haul segment in markets, such as, South America, Latin America and Africa (exhibit 6). Markets 
which compose more than 50% of the company’s total revenue (exhibit 9).    
 
                                                          
19 Load Factor is the production compared to capacity. It is obtained from dividing Revenue passenger 
miles(RPMs) by the ASMs. RPM is the multiplication of the number of passengers flying with the length 
of the flight. For instance, 100 passengers flying 500 miles generate 50000 RPMs[3]. In figure 5 FSCs are 
composed by Lufthansa, Air France – KLM and IAG, and LCCs by easyJet and Ryanair 












Figure 6: Comparison of load factors 




TAP’s 2015-2020 strategic plan  
In sequence of what is already being done, TAP has a long-term strategic vision it wants to 
achieve before the end of 2020. The company has six main long-term goals[33]: 
 Renewal and expansion of the fleet: TAP intends to have a young fleet in comparison with the industry’s 
average, which will hopefully allow TAP to maintain competitive advantage in unit costs.  
 Evolution of the company’s business model: TAP intends to develop its product in order to compete with 
the highest industry standards while providing the greater comfort to passengers. It also has the goal to 
increase the weight of ancillary revenues on total revenues. 
 Empowerment and improvements on the customer experience: The current long-term strategy aims at 
further differentiate the services offered by TAP from the LCCs, ensuring the continuous increase in 
competitive advantages from the passengers’ point of view.  
 Growth consolidation and increased focus on the hubs: TAP intends to keep growing its network and 
increase focus on the Lisbon base operations allowing its continuous improvement. It is the company’s goal 
to reinforce its position in the markets it is currently present in and to grow in markets with high potential 
in which the company has a lower presence.  
 Improve operational efficiency: TAP intends to develop an additional effort in optimizing its cost structure 
with the objective of ensuring a base that allows a sustainable growth as efficient as possible. 
 Reposition the maintenance units in Portugal and Brazil: The Portuguese unit will continue to serve 
primarily TAP’s fleet but increase its efforts in capturing an external market. The Brazilian unit will 
consolidate the results in its restructuring program. 
TAP’s goals approach the main challenges of the company but are still somewhat vague and 
don’t cover everything the company will have to do in order to stay competitive. Furthermore, 
the company states it wants to increase competitive advantages in the eyes of the customer but 























Figure 7: TAP’s average revenue per passenger per route in 2013 




value proposition. It also lacks consideration regarding what customer segments to pursue, 
which can indicate the company is still not sure about its future strategy.  
Conclusion 
The gap between the low-cost’s and the full-service’s business model is getting thinner[19]. With 
FSCs adopting some features that were for many years characteristic to LCCs, such as the need 
for ancillary revenues and cost efficiency, and as LCCs attempt to capture a higher share of the 
less price sensitive customers, by offering complementary services and beginning to explore the 
long-haul possibility, the aviation industry is yet to see major changes in the years to come.  
Given this, FSCs have two major strategic options to follow when choosing how to tackle the 
low-cost competition. One path is to differentiate themselves enough so that their value 
proposition is significantly higher and worth paying a premium for, or, they can choose to 
undergo major restructuring, and transform their business model in a way that enables price 
competition with LCCs.  
As low-cost carriers are effectively penetrating the Portuguese market and with TAP’s 
privatization process to be completed this year, Fernando Pinto, should take the threat of LCCs 
seriously and make the necessary changes to the company’s current outlined strategic plan, so 






Exhibit 1 – TAP’s income statement 
(values in thousands of euros) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Sales and Services 2 315 521   2 438 880   2 618 049   2 669 027   2 698 321   
Operating Grants 4 565   3 253   4 312   3 852   1 151   
Gains and losses in associates -44 066   -11 124   4 110   706   1 611   
Variation in production -838   10 512   -7 887   -5 072   8 894   
Own work capitalised 2 406   950   1 144   1 593   791   
Cost of goods sold and materials consumed -175 829   -188 272   -205 028   -214 811   -276 583   
External supplies and services -1 444 939   -1 647 060   -1 768 063   -1 705 328   -1 816 262   
Personnel costs -559 721   -523 970   -506 883   -571 855   -578 880   
Inventory adjustments (losses/reversals) 3 966   -2 448   -1 964   -5 908   -105   
Impairment of debts receivable (losses/reversals) 4 307   588   3 323   -366   -14 044   
Provisions (increases/decreases) 3 701   12 603   3 687   3 623   -5 706   
Fair value increase/reductions 0   255   2 210   -410   104   
Other income and gains 75 108   47 638   55 972   49 359   103 958   
Other costs and losses -45 540   -35 332   -42 443   -64 598   -33 257   
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation 138 641   106 473   160 539   159 812   89 993   
      
Depreciation and amortisation cost/reversals -138 622   -122 190   -119 776   -115 751   -85 437   
Impairment of assets subject to depreciation/amortisation  -440   -2 350   0   0   -1 984   
Net operating Income (earnings before interests and taxes) -421   -18 067   40 763   44 061   2 572   
      
Interest and similar revenue received 6 896   8 596   5 696   6 155   3 091   
Interest and similiar costs paid -50 893   -55 032   -57 371   -50 656   -84 509   
Pre-tax earnings -44 418   -64 503   -10 912   -440   -78 846   
      
Corporate income tax for the year -8 497   -7 700   -9 196   -475   -2 103   
Net Income for the year -52 915   -72 203   -20 108   -915   -80 949   
      
Net Income of shareholders of the parent company -57 103   -76 807   -25 487   -5 868   -85 096   
Net income of non-controlling interests 4 188   4 604   5 378   4 953   4 147   
      



















Source: IATA’s Vision 2050 report 
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Exhibit 3 – Comparison between FSCs and LCCs business models 
Characteristic feature FSC LCC 
Generic Strategy Differentiation Cost minimisation/cost leadership, 
entrepreneurial in character 
Scale Typically large Generally smaller, but some major 
players 
(e.g. Ryanair, EasyJet) 
Operational Model Hub and spoke/Multiple hub and 
spoke, linking with feeder routes  
Mix of short/medium/ and long-haul 
routes 
Moderate Capacity utilisation  
Multiple aircraft models  
Point to point, no interlining, short-
sector length (400 – 600 nautical 
miles) 
Mainly short haul 
Uniform aircraft type 
High capacity utilization, rapid 
turnaround between sectors 
Market In competition with other FSCs and 
LCCs, leading to differentiation by 
class (quality) of service, with high 
service image, including: 
Frequent scheduling & flight flexibility 
Extensive in-flight services 
Comprehensive ground services 
Use of main airports 
Moderate focus on ancillary revenues 
 
Cheap travel sector of the market, 
segmentation by time of booking and 
choice of flight 
Quality of service basic, e.g.: 
Little flexibility of flight changes (use 
or lose!) 
No catering (or meals charged for) 
Ground services typically outsourced 
Typically use secondary airports 
High focus on ancillary revenues 
Inventory management Pre-arranged tickets and seats: 
reservation system complex, due to 
feeder routes: use of travel agents 
Inventory management simplified: 
direct or online bookings, ticketless, 
no use of travel agents 
Labour Specialized workforce 
Higher Wages 
Lower Flexibility 









Table partially drawn from Hunter, L., 2006 
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Exhibit 5 – Fleet differences 
 
 
Exhibit 6 – TAP routes and load factor per route 
 
 
Fleet 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Nº of Aircraft Models in 2014 
TAP 71 71 71 71 77 8 
Lufthansa Airlines 342 355 360 431 423 10 
Air France - KLM Group 625 609 573 611 571 20 
IAG - 348 377 431 459 > 9 
Ryanair 231 272 294 305 297 1 
easyJet 196 204 214 217 226 2 
# of Routes 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Portugal 8 7 7 7 7 
Europe 35 41 44 42 49 
North America 1 2 2 2 2 
Africa 11 13 13 15 15 
Latin America 1 1 1 1 3 
South America 9 9 9 9 11 
Total 65 73 76 76 87 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
TAP 6,35% 6,39% 7,13% 6,68% 7,21%
Lufthansa 9,24% 8,72% 9,01% 8,92% 9,21%








% of Other Revenue in Total Revenues
Source: Company’s Annual Reports 
Source: Company’s Annual Reports 

























TAP 7 42 2 15 1 9 0 76 
Partner Companies 1 59 23 6 1 24 8 122 
Load factor per route 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Portugal* 60,9% 65,7% 65,9% 69,0% - 
Europe 68,1% 71,2% 72,7% 75,9% - 
North America 80,2% 76,4% 80,1% 82,8% - 
Africa 71,9% 72,8% 73,5% 76,6% - 
Latin America 68,8% 78,6% 78,0% 85,9% - 
South America 83,4% 83,1% 82,5% 84,2% - 
Total 74,5% 76,3% 76,8% 79,4% 79,9% 
Source: TAP Annual Report 2013 
Source: TAP’s Annual Reports 
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Exhibit 7 – Factors that influence operating margin 
Exhibit 8 –Passengers increase, load factor and revenue growth 
                                                          
21 Compound Annual Growth Rate 
22 Incorporation of Germanwings into Lufthansa Airlines  
23 Acquisition of Vuelling 
Passengers (millions) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 GAGR21 
TAP 9,1 9,7 10,2 10,7 11,4 4,6% 
Lufthansa Airlines 58,84 65,42 74,7422 76,26 77,5 5,7% 
Air France - KLM 71,39 71,32 77,4 77,3 77,5 1,7% 
IAG - 51,7 54,6 6723 77 10,5% 
Ryanair 66,5 72,1 75,8 79,3 81,7 4,2% 
easyJet 48,8 54,5 58,4 60,8 64,8 5,8% 
Source: Company’s Annual Reports 























Load factor 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 CAGR 
TAP 75% 76% 77% 79% 80% 1% 
Lufthansa 79% 77% 78% 79% 79% 0% 
Air France - KLM 81% 82% 83% 84% 85% 1% 
IAG - 79% 80% 81% 80% 0% 
Ryanair 82% 83% 82% 82% 83% 0% 
easyJet 87% 87% 89% 89% 91% 1% 
% Sales Passengers 
Portugal 5,2% 14,3% 
Europe 36,3% 61,2% 
North America 4,5% 2,4% 
Africa 15,5% 6,8% 
Latin America 3,7% 0,9% 
South America 34,8% 14,4% 
Total 100,0% 100,0% 
2011 2012 2013 2014
TAP 5,3% 7,3% 1,9% 1,1%
FSC's -1,0% 8,1% -1,0% 2,7%











Source: Company’s Annual Reports 
Source: Company’s Annual Reports 





This section is intended to provide guidelines for the instructor. It contains a summary of the 
case, suggested assignment questions as well as possible answers that relate the case with 
relevant theory and industry specific approaches.  
Synopsis 
TAP, the Portuguese national airline carrier was founded in 1945, and since then it has been the 
predominant airline operating in the Portuguese market. It offers short, medium and long-haul 
and routes, focusing mainly focusing on the European, South American and African territories.  
However, in recent years it has been losing market share in the short-haul segment to low-cost 
carriers, who continue to penetrate and grow in the Portuguese market.  
Given the current threat low-cost carriers pose to TAP, the company has to make a strategic 
decision on how to adapt to this kind of competition and how to best react to LCCs. Should it 
focus its strategy on differentiating, thus offering a value proposition that is worth paying a 
premium for? Or should the company restructure the business and compete with the low-cost 
airlines on price terms? 
Recommended assignment questions 
The following questions are divided into two parts. The core question which addresses the main 
issue of the case and additional questions that intend to analyse a few important aspects also 
mentioned in the case.  
Core question: 
1. Imagine you are an advisor to Fernando Pinto. What would you recommend regarding 
the competition with low-cost carriers? 
Additional questions for discussion: 
1. In your opinion what are the reasons behind the success of low-cost carriers in Europe? 
2. How would you define the aviation industry in terms of competition? 





The case study was developed according to the following teaching objectives: 
 For students to understand the challenges and key aspects of dealing with low-cost 
competition. 
 To interpret the difficulties of operating in a highly competitive industry.  
 To comprehend the differences between the low-cost’s and the full-service carriers’ 
business models.  
 For students to analyse the environment of the aviation industry at a macro level, 
making use of strategic frameworks, such as, the Porter’s five forces framework. 
 To present a strategic solution to TAP’s problem having into consideration the 
consequences of both alternatives. 
Analysis 
Core question 
1. Imagine you are an advisor to Fernando Pinto. What would you recommend regarding 
the competition with low-cost carriers? 
As it is stated in the case airlines have two main strategies to fight against low-cost competitors. 
They can choose to keep their prices high or they can opt to lower their prices and try to fight 
LCCs on price terms.  
In order to keep their prices higher and retain market share, full-service carriers need to find 
ways to differentiate themselves. There is the need to offer a high enough value proposition so 
that customers are willing to pay a premium for the extra features offered[20]. This ensures 
incumbent firms24 are able to achieve success while not competing directly with its low-cost 
counterparts. Instead, they can create a premium segment in the market and satisfy the needs 
of less price sensitive consumers.  
This strategy is more efficient when companies have strong brands and operate in industries 
with highly differentiated products. It is also easier to implement such a strategy when a large 
share of consumers is not price sensitive and when the overall market doesn’t grow substantially 
with the introduction of low price levels[6].  
                                                          
24 Powerful, established companies that have a large market share.  
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Keeping the prices higher is also, in some cases, the only possible outcome, since large 
established firms find it hard to compete on prices due to the difficulty of reducing costs and 
increasing operational efficiency. Even after spending considerable time and resources in 
lowering costs there is a great chance that incumbent firms will not be able to equal the cost 
structure of its low-cost rivals[6].  
Nevertheless, this strategy has some risks and downsides. For a firm to offer a significantly 
higher value proposition it has to monitor its value proposition from the perspective of its 
consumers, and it needs to be able to communicate these differentiating aspects in a way that 
drives consumers into paying the premium.  It is also important to be aware of the customers’ 
level of brand-loyalty and switching costs in order to avoid underestimating the low-cost’s 
penetration potential[30]. 
The other possible path for airlines to follow is to try to compete with LCCs on prices and this 
can be done in two ways, severe restructuring that transform the company into a low-cost 
carrier, or create its own low-cost subsidiary which can be achieved from using, for instance, 
extra capacity and current means, building a brand new company, or by acquiring an existing 
LCC and take advantage of already existing operations.  
Price matching is appropriate for markets where there is a large share of price sensitive 
customers, significant economies of scale, firms that offer undifferentiated goods, and if it is an 
industry where the overall market grows if price levels decrease[6].  
The first approach to price matching, has often been used by companies that want to stop the 
low-cost’s growth, or even lead these companies to failure, and are available to cut into its own 
margins and endure losses until the low-cost rival has exited the market. However, this path is 
not advisable as a defensive strategy since, low-cost companies may still exist after these 
sacrifices and incumbents are worst off in the end. Instead, companies should compete on prices 
if their aim is to increase profitability[27]. Complete restructuring is usually hard to implement 
due to the difficulty in lowering costs to a level that equals the low-cost rivals. Companies also 
need to be aware of competitive convergence[6], which means if a company focuses too much 
on cutting services they think are not worth a premium to the consumer, products will end up 
competing solely on prices as all the differentiating factors will fade. This may be hurtful to 
incumbent companies if in the end they are not able to fully match the lower prices and their 
product is not differentiated anymore.    
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The second approach, which involves the creation or acquisition of a low cost brand, in this case 
a low-cost carrier, is more effective since it allows large corporations to fight the low-cost 
competition directly while differentiating its older brand to a more premium service. It also helps 
the main brand to keep its current loyal customers that are willing to pay more, while having a 
say in the lower end of the market, slowing down the competitors’ growth and having direct 
access to the developing low-cost segment. This approach also has some risks, mainly due to the 
possibility of cannibalization, therefore it is important for companies to distinguish and 
communicate assertively the benefits and services provided by each brand so that the entire 
company is able to capture both segments of the market in an effective way[27]. Another 
downside of this approach is the investment required to start or acquire a new company. This 
approach is only possible if the company has the ability to invest or if it has extra capacity.  
Focusing on what is stated above, the strategy that appears to be more efficient for the airline 
industry, is to find a way to compete on prices since a large share of customers are price 
sensitive, the main product does not offer significant differentiation and the overall market has 
indeed grown with the introduction of low price levels. Nonetheless, TAP cannot restructure 
itself in a way that enables competition with low-cost carriers on prices, using its own brand, 
due the difficulty in cost cutting, which derives, for instance, from the unionized workforce.  And, 
at first sight, (exhibit 1) it does not have the necessary investment capacity to start or buy a low-
cost carrier. 
Thus, the best possible alternative is to maintain its strategic course and follow the path of 
differentiation. With TAP’s privatization, most probably, the company will have less public 
service requirements and can increase its focus on the more profitable long-haul routes (exhibit 
9).  It should also differentiate itself in a way that attracts low price-sensitive passengers that 
are willing to pay a premium. One of these segments is the business travelers. TAP can follow 
the footsteps of Lufthansa and try to provide a leadership service that retains the high-end class. 
As the company is a renowned airline between Europe-South America and Europe-Africa, it can 
utilize its premium brand image to provide the best service for business travelers within these 
routes. Possibly even, maximizing and increasing the first and business class capacity.  
There is also the remote possibility that TAP can utilize its extra capacity, mainly with the PGA 
fleet and transform its Portuguese subsidiary into its Low-cost operator, nonetheless, significant 






Additional questions for discussion 
1. In your opinion what are the reasons behind the success of low-cost carriers in 
Europe?  
Low-cost carriers operate short-haul point to point flights and Europe is the perfect market to 
operate such a strategy. As it is referred in the case most flights in the European Union originate 
and land in the European Union. Furthermore, Europe is relatively small which means, amenities 
are not missed by the majority of customers in short flights. It is possible to assume that 
passengers oftenly tend to choose the airline completely based on price since the service is not 
a relevant necessity in short-haul flights.     
Despite the territorial advantages that Europe provides there are other factors that led to the 
rapid growth of the low-cost carriers. Many airports provide special benefits to LCCs so they can 
fly to that area and help develop the region. Usually this happens in secondary airports.  
The technological advancements and the increase in airplane’s efficiency also helped LCCs thrive 
since it enabled these companies to lower their unit costs and to offer low prices.  
Another important factor is that when LCCs started to appear, FSCs undermined their ability to 
succeed, by believing customers would prefer quality over price when it came to choosing an 
airline. This enhanced the growth of LCCs since full-service carriers didn’t react to the new 
competition when they should have. Furthermore, to react and lower their costs, FSCs went 
through severe restructuring processes that are usually demanding on time. Once again, this 
enabled LCCs to grow without much opposition from the FSCs.   
2. How would you define the aviation industry in terms of competitiveness? 
To answer this question it is important to understand the industry competitiveness by first 
analyzing each of the aspects that compose the competitive environment. One way to do this is 
to look at the industry using Michael Porter’s 5-forces framework. This model takes into 
consideration the threat of new entrants, the threat of substitute products and the bargaining 
power of suppliers and buyers. After analyzing all of these aspects it is possible to reach a 
conclusion regarding the rivalry among existing competitors. 
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Despite what many may think, the threat of new entrants in the airline industry is high. As it is 
stated in the case, several new airlines were formed in the past years. This is mainly due to the 
fact that the barriers to entry are low.  
Deregulation, affected the way in which airport slots are granted and made it easier for airlines 
to get access to certain airports. Also, after the deregulation, government policies to defend the 
position of incumbent flag carriers became less effective.  
Access to the distribution channels is becoming easier, with the introduction of the internet, 
new airlines can offer their services to a big number of online travel agencies quickly. Customer 
switching costs are low. Although alliances make it harder to switch between two airlines of 
different alliances, it makes no difference in switching between two airlines of the same alliance. 
Another important aspect is the cost of acquiring aircraft, which is high, but the appearance of 
several leasing companies and private investors, makes the search for funding more accessible.  
The threat of substitute products is medium but it is increasing. Airplanes are still different from 
every other transport in terms of speed of travel, however with technological advancements this 
difference may begin to fade specifically in the short-haul point-to-point routes, with the 
emergence of high-speed trains. Air travel is also more inconvenient than its alternatives due to 
the high security measures and protocols that are needed before the flight. Nevertheless, the 
increase in efficiency and cost reduction of the airline travel industry is so far winning and 
counterbalancing the appearance of other means of transportation.   
Nonetheless, the threat of substitute products doesn’t come merely from other means of 
transportation but also from services that can substitute the need to travel. In the case of leisure 
travelers, they can choose to spend their money on other activities, and in the case of business 
travelers, it is possible to satisfy some business needs through new technologies, such as, video 
conferences. 
The bargaining power of suppliers is high. For airlines we can divide the suppliers into five types. 
The manufacturers, labour, airports, ground handling services/catering and sources of financing.  
There are few manufacturers capable of producing passenger aircrafts. These are spread among 
a handful of companies (the most know are Boeing and Airbus) which in turn can subcontract 
companies to build the engines and other parts. This means that the aircraft market is highly 
concentrated and as stated in the case, fleet commonality has several benefits which means the 
cost of switching between suppliers can be substantial.  
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Labour is another important supplier of airlines, since these are dependent on their skilled 
workforce, (pilots, crew and maintenance) to perform their business activity. This dependency, 
associated with powerful work unions, typically in FSCs, makes it hard for airlines to manage 
their work force efficiently. TAP’s pilot syndicate, for instance, went into strike for 10 days in 
May 2015, costing to the company approximately 35 million euros[13]. These aspects make the 
labour force one of the most powerful suppliers in the airline industry.  
Sources of financing also have relative bargaining power since airlines are dependent on these 
to run their business. Although competition in this sector is also high and airlines have many 
options to choose from.  
Airports are often local monopolies since the competition from secondary airports is low. Which 
means switching costs between airports are high especially for FSCs depending on the 
connecting flights.  
Ground Handling services, are typically the factor that poses the least threat to airlines since 
there are many companies capable of providing these services, and airlines can also operate this 
services in-house which means their dependency on the suppliers is not significant.  
The bargaining power of airline customers is high. The industry of traveling has changed and 
airlines are betting on the online channels to sell tickets. However, as this trend spreads, big 
traveling websites are concentrating the consumers buying power which means airlines can 
become dependent on these websites to sell tickets. Furthermore it is a well-known fact that 
these websites (skyscanner, edreams among others…) compare prices of several airlines 
increasing the options for the end consumers.  A big share of end consumers is highly price 
sensitive, which can be confirmed by the rapid growth of LCCs, which means their loyalty 
towards a specific airline is low as well as their switching costs.    
For business consumers, as it is stated in the case, travel agents often hold most of the corporate 
demand and these agents can switch between airlines easily since they have to operate with a 
specific budget.  
Given all of the factors mentioned above it is clear that the airline industry is highly competitive. 
Airlines compete on quantity and price. These factors are based on several strategic decisions 
that a company has to make. On the long term the company has to decide about its capacity and 
its capacity is driven by the number of airplanes and type of planes it has in operation. This 
choice is not easy since bigger aircrafts can lower the marginal cost per passenger but they can 
also compromise a company’s financial health. Bigger airplanes are more expensive and the cost 
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per flight is fairly the same in spite of the occupation of the plane. Capacity is also related to the 
number of flights and the destinations the company chooses to offer.  
Pricing, is done daily through complex yield management systems (TAP introduced its new 
system recently) in order to maximize profits. However, these tools take into account the 
competitors prices which means they also limit the possible payoff and are even a tool for a 
more intense price competition[15]. 
Deregulation was also a major cause for an increase in competition for all the reasons mentioned 
above. Furthermore, airlines offer in essence a similar product. Even if it is a LCC or a FSC the 
need satisfied is the same, which is to go from one point to another. This makes it harder for 
airlines to differentiate themselves and increases the tendency to a price competition. It is also 
relatively easy for airlines within a segment to copy other’s products, for instance, loyalty 
programs, amenities offered on board, among others. Furthermore, as costs decrease and 
operational efficiency increases, there is the temptation of lowering prices again, which reduces 
margins and increases price competition.  
Overall there are several factors which make the airline industry very competitive. We talked 
about the most important aspects, and the ones reflected on the case. Nonetheless, Michael 










Source: Michael Porter in IATA’s Vision 2050 Report.  
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3. What do you think are the trends in the industry? 
The aviation industry is yet so see major changes in the coming years. The increase in efficiency, 
lower prices, globalization, the development of emerging economies, all lead to forecasts 
predicting significant growth for all markets in the years to come. 
The market is converging and the differences between low-cost carriers and full-service carriers 
are slowly fading. This is due to the effort FSCs are making in cutting costs and finding alternative 
revenue methods, such as ancillary revenues. This means the product offered by LCCs and FSCs 
tends to become similar. As stated in the previous questions, this phenomena has some risks, 
however, it also represents an opportunity for companies who truly want to differentiate and 
pursue a high-end market. 
Competition is going to increase, since some full-service carriers, such as Lufthansa, have been 
entering the low-cost segment through its own subsidiaries and offering point-to-point routes 
in an effort to transfer the less profitable short-haul segment to these companies. Also, some 
low-cost carriers are moving upwards in their customer segments and are now trying to capture 
a share of the business market which, until recently, was granted territory for FSCs. EasyJet, for 
example, is transforming its business model shifting from a pure LCC into a hybrid carrier since 
it now offers flexible ticketing, and some other amenities. Competition is also going to increase 
in the long-haul with the growth of emerging airlines, such as, Emirates, Qatar, Etihad and 
Turkish Airlines, and with the LCCs intending to enter this segment.   
Overall, in spite of its maturity, the aviation industry is flexible and prone to change in the coming 
years. In the long-run with technological developments, who knows if there will be even lower 






There are useful frameworks and concepts in the literature that help to understand the industry 
and strategic decisions regarding the competition with low-cost rivals. For the present analysis, 
2 frameworks and other relevant concepts were considered.  
Porter’s Five Forces 
The Porter’s five forces framework was developed my Michael Porter and helps understand the 
industry’s profitability and competition[26]. “Understanding the competitive forces and their 
underlying causes, reveals the roots of an industry’s current profitability while providing a 
framework for anticipating and influencing competition (and profitability) over time.” (Porter, 
M., 2011). The framework is comprised by the following factors: threat of new entrants, 
bargaining power of buyers, threat of substitute products, bargaining power of suppliers and 
rivalry among existing competitors. “The extended rivalry that results from all five forces defines 
an industry’s structure and shapes the nature of competitive interaction within an industry.” 








Low-cost Business Model 
The low-cost business model has been vastly described and studied in the literature, and there 
are many similarities that can be found in distinct low-cost business across varied industries. 
These similarities allowed BCG to comply an analysis identifying the main factors of the low-cost 
business models. 




The article states that there are four golden rules of low-cost business models. Low-cost doesn’t 
mean low-margin, instead low-cost business can have some of the best margins in their 
respective industries (as it happens with LCCs). Low-cost it is not a synonym for lower quality, 
instead it is usually a synonym for a narrower range[18]. Low-cost is innovation rather than, 
imitation and “low-cost is not unbranded. It is frequently supported by potent brands” 
(Kachaner, N., Lindgardt, Z. & Michael, D., 2010). 
A framework for responding to low-cost rivals 
The competition with low-cost companies has attracted the attention of several researchers and 
academics in an effort of finding an effective approach to fight low-cost challengers. One of the 
articles considered in the analysis also includes a framework. It defends that the competition 
Source: Kachaner, N., Lindgardt, Z. & Michael, D., 2010 
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with low-cost companies should be done in a sequential way after a careful analysis of three 
main questions displayed in the framework: 
 
According to the author, market leaders tend to ignore and underestimate the threat low-cost 
rivals, thus, postponing their response “When market leaders do respond, they often set off 
price wars, hurting themselves more than the challengers” (Kumar, N., 2006) therefore 
companies should assess its customers for the willingness to pay a premium for differentiated 
benefits, and, only if the number of customers willing to pay more is insufficient, the company 
should attack the low-cost business directly.  
Strategies to compete with low-cost rivals 
Barry Berman, states that established firms can respond to low-cost competition via one of four 
strategies. These strategies are, waiting and watching, keeping the current pricing strategy, 
coming close or matching the low-cost competitor’s price levels, or develop a fighting brand to 
be inserted into the low-cost segment.   
Source: Kumar Nirmalya, Harvard Business Review, 2006 
37 
 
According to the author “established firms with strong brands, highly differentiated goods and 
services, and/or complex products are the most likely to find success with the strategy of 
keeping current pricing and not directly competing against low-cost competitors” while 
“matching or coming close to low-cost competitor’s price levels is appropriate for markets with 
the following characteristics: a large and growing segment of price-conscious consumers, 
significant economies of scale, firms that offer undifferentiated goods and services, and 
decreasing price levels that can drastically expand the overall market for a good or service” 
(Berman, B., 2015). 
Companies that rely only on its products’ quality and reliability can see their customers switch 
if a lower price offering is presented and shows similar quality. “By contrast, customers attracted 
to a premium brand because it offers a total solution – for instance, financing, very high levels 
of technical support or service, and strong personal relationships – may be less likely to switch” 
(Ryans, A., 2010), therefore companies, when differentiating, could sell complete solutions 
rather than increasing the benefits of an existing product. Differentiation is also defended by 
Joan Magretta[22] who states companies should compete to be unique, not to be the best. The 
competition to be the best will lead companies into benchmarking each other, increase the 
competition and not on increasing its value proposition. “Customer, lacking meaningful choice, 
buy on price alone, Profitability deteriorates.” (Magretta, J., 2011). 
Starting a fighter brand is also one of the possibilities accessed in the analysis. Many airlines 
entered the low-cost segment by acquiring or starting a low-cost business. These new 
companies are intended to fight directly the low-cost rivals and ideally eliminate them. 
Nonetheless, there some risks in pursuing such a strategy as outlined by, Mark Ritson in his 
article regarding the launch of fighter brands. The first risk is cannibalization meaning that the 
fighter brand may penetrate into some of the premium brand’s existing consumers. The second 
hazard is the failure to bury the competition, which occurs when companies are too afraid of 
cannibalization and restrain its fighter brands potential. There is also the possibility of financial 
losses for the company if the fighter brand does not perform as well as expected. Furthermore, 
established companies start low-cost brands in an effort to fight the competition, not to satisfy 
a new customer need, meaning customer focus is sometimes lost and this can severely hurt the 
company. Lastly, incumbents that start lower-end brands can be distracted since “Launching a 




Yield Management Pricing, is the pricing method used by most airlines. This type of pricing 
system is ideal for companies that have, relatively fixed capacity, are booked via reservation and 
have low marginal costs compared to fixed costs[5]. “The fundamental objective of yield 
management pricing is to adjust prices to fill all available capacity” (Berman, B., 2005) often 
done by adjusting prices according to time and occupancy rates. For instance, lower prices may 
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